

















Russia has seen a dramatic decline of over 50% in agricultural production
between 1991-1996 (Goscomstat). Such a catastrophic fall is normally only seen
in situations of extreme destabilization, war, or famine. The question this paper
addresses is why has this occurred. A signiﬁcant body of literature has grown up
concerning the problems and lessons of privatization and economic adjustment
(OECD, 1991; UNCTAD, 1994). Most contributions have been concerned with
economic efﬁciency questions and the degree to which government should or
should not play a role in managing the process. It has been suggested that the main
lesson of economic adjustment in Eastern Europe has been that ﬁnancial and
stabilization policies are not sustainable unless they are supported by adequate
structural and social policies (Tulin, 1995). In addition, transformation of the legal
and institutional frameworks of society has to keep pace with the changes that
take place in the ﬁscal and monetary area.
The OECD established a widely accepted set of principles that would be
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ISSN: 1096-7508 All rights of reproduction in any form reservedrequired in order for planned economies to be able to transform to market
economies. To measure the progress towards effective transition we use their set
of simple measures (Dhanji et al, 1991). We have grouped these into three main
dimensions and we examine the areas that are relevant to the agricultural
economy:
Monetary and ﬁscal measures:
1. The effect of monetary stabilization in the agricultural sector. This includes a
comparison of industrial with agricultural production and their consequences in
agriculture upon yields and the need for imports.
Institutional measures:
1. The changing legal environment.
2. The effects of privatization.
3. The effect of inﬂation and changing terms of trade.
4. Capital investment including equipment.
5. Physical infrastructure including transport, distribution and marketing channels.
Systemic, supporting, and cultural measures:
1. Management education and training.
2. Changes in the business environment. The informal economy.
It would be difﬁcult to make an accurate assessment on each of these measures.
It is not the intention of this paper to examine the details of the macro economic
changes, which has been done by other authors (Sachs, 1995) nor to provide a
economic critique which has been done elsewhere (Yavlinsky and Braguinsky,
1994). Instead, we examine the reform process to see how effective it has been at
the macro and micro level. The measures above provide us with a useful general
perspective.
First, we consider in general macro terms the monetary and ﬁscal measures in
terms of their impact in the agricultural sector. Second, we evaluate the success
of institutional measures to provide for a new legal system, enforce property
rights, ensure competition, and the mobility of capital and labor. Third, we assess
key support and cultural measures, such as the predictability of the business
environment, the restoration of public morality, business ethics the critical
dimension of psychological mind set required for marketization. However, these
dimensions must be seen within the context of the political changes that have also
taken place during the same period.
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Has stabilization been achieved in the agricultural sector?
The ﬁrst set of measures would be considered by many as the most important.
If ﬁscal and monetary stabilization had been successful, economic adjustment
would automatically follow.
It is clear from the evidence that economic stabilization had not been achieved
by 1997 either in terms of the normal macro economic indicators, or in critical
sectors such as agriculture. Average incomes had declined. Some commentators
have suggested that the situation was intolerable and that the Russian government
should have taken a positive interventionist approach to impose macro economic
stability and create reliable institutions. Others suggested that government did not
have the resources, motivation or power to take on the positive role suggested.
They argued that there was no point in trying to restore elements of steering that
were characteristic of a planned economy which had signﬁcantly failed in its
objectives (Nellis, 1995). The fear was that the imposition of strong government
would mean a prolongation of economic and social misery, the entrenchment of
rent seeking, anti market forces, further suboptimization of growth (Nellis, 1995).
That leading advisors of the government such as Sachs suggested that the failure
to achieve stabilization in Russia by 1995 was due to a lack of application of the
market policy measures he advocated, not by a failure of those measures. Even in
1995, he still held to the view that what has become known as shock therapy was
the most effective way to deal with the problems identiﬁed.
Basic economic conditions did not look good in the early 1990s. There was still
a need to use foreign currency to buy in basic foodstuffs which Russia itself might
have been able to provide for (in 1997, Russia imported 60% of its milk, 28% of
its meat, 33% of its oil, etc.). The cost of such staple food imports was a
signiﬁcant drain to the public purse, amounting in one year to over $13 billion.
There is some evidence to support Sachs’ view that government has failed to
push through market reforms vigorously enough. In 1993, for example, subsidies
to the agricultural sector still amounted to about 5% of Russia’s GDP. In
comparison, in the USA only 0.2% of GDP was spent on agricultural subsidies
and the corresponding ﬁgure for the European Community was 1% (Bobyliv and
Libert, 1994). This support included exemption of new farms from many taxes.
They also beneﬁted from state subsidies for heating, natural gas, and other types
of fuel such as coal.
Together with this failure to push through the shock therapy approach,
however, there was a continued decline in output in the agricultural sector. Total
grain production in 1996 was 59.8 million metric tonnes (mmt), 40, 5% less then
in 1992. Sugar beet output fell even more sharply, by 43.3% to just 14.2 mmt. The
livestock sector continued to contract in 1996, with meat production down 15, 1
% and milk production down 16,2% (Goscomstat, 1997). Farmers have been
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prices have led to a liquidity crisis and low proﬁtability. The result has been
effective destocking, increased debt and reduced investment, output and innova-
tion.
The effect of the lack of stabilization and of continuing depression has been
devastating in a variety of ways. One indicator of the lack of positive change has
been the failure of the agricultural sector to improve its performance. The two
tables below show graphically how change from a planned economy to a market
economy has not led so far to improvements in performance. Indeed, although the
cumulative decline in industrial production is slightly more than in agriculture, the
reality is that decline in agriculture is of greater signiﬁcance. First, this is because
in agriculture, recovery cannot be achieved overnight. The manufacturing
industry could recover within one or two years from poor sales. In agriculture,
however, losses in one year can only be made up over the next ﬁve or six years.
Second, the effect of the decline in agriculture is seen immediately in the lack of
food available and in the need to import more from abroad. The example of two
key staple products shows this. If we look at grain and milk yields, we can see that
the effect of the lack of monetary and ﬁscal stability has led, directly or indirectly,
to a signiﬁcant decline.
To conclude the brief assessment of the monetary and ﬁscal dimension, it can
be suggested that the reform program has had an identiﬁable negative impact. One
important consequence of this was the accelerated development of the informal
economy both at the enterprise level and by individuals as a substitute for
Table 1. Economic Depression in Russia, 1991–1997
(% Change, year on year)
GDP Industrial Production Agricultural Production*
1991 213 28 29.3
1992 219 218.8 217.8
1993 212 26 29.2
1994 215 221 213.5
1995 23 26 23.5
Table 2. Comparative Milk Yields 1991–1996
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by enterprises to plan for the medium term. This meant that it was difﬁcult to
accumulate investment for the future, resulting in continuing decline in output and
yields. Overall the main conclusion that can be drawn from the indicators
available covering the monetary and ﬁscal dimension is that cumulatively the
agricultural sector had by 1997 reached a critical point of crisis.
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
Assessing the success of the institutional measures to push through and regulate
reform in the early 1990s is not an easy task. Many laws and directives were
passed, but many of them appear to have had little short term effect in triggering
economic change. We outline the major legal changes affecting agriculture and
assess their impact.
Changes in the Legal Environment
On what might be considered the most important measure, it could be claimed
that the government were very successful. By early 1995, only about 15% of land
remained in the hands of the state. Legal changes have allowed the development
of private enterprise which has resulted in fundamental legal changes in
agriculture. In the former Soviet Union, agriculture was based on large-scale
collective and state farms cultivating state-owned land. There were two types of
ownership. Social ownership was dominant in the industrial sector. Collective
ownership was dominant in the agricultural sector. The non-land assets of
collective and state farms including agricultural buildings, glasshouses, livestock,
machinery and other farm equipment were distributed to former employees after
1990.
Approximately 110 legal documents have been enacted since 1990 at the
federal level to form the legal basis for agricultural reform. Options for farm
registration included collective and individual forms of organization (Brooks and
Lerman, 1994). The three main new legal forms of organization are the following:
Table 3. Comparative Wheat Yields Centi-
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Privatization and Transition Issues in Russian Agriculture 543a. Limited-liability companies, partnership, in which land and asset shares go to
the founders who work on the farm.
b. Joint-stock companies, a form similar to the limited-liability partnership, except
that stock certiﬁcates are issued to owners according to the value of their land
and asset shares.
c. Agriculture co-operatives, these enterprises are established on the basis of land
and assets shares of members of the former collective farm, and in general
members work on the farm.
As an individual form of organization, private peasant or farmers farms provide
an alternative to collective forms of organization. They are farms based on
privately owned land and established in many cases by individuals who left their
collective or state farms and their land and asset shares. Peasant farms may form
a local association of peasant farms (Brooks and Lerman, 1994). This is a kind of
production or service co-operative, the members of which in theory should all be
registered private farmers.
Despite all these changes aimed at creating a new legal system which clearly
enshrined and enforced property rights and privatized enterprises, the state has
failed to carry through the reforms to provide a meaningful positive change. The
main problem with the legal changes of ownership that occurred after 1991 was
that although private ownership was permitted and enacted, the reality was that
there was no market in land. This was partly due to the fact that there were no
agreed systems or procedures for the valuation of land, and partly due to fact that
land is not recognized as a collateral asset. The consequence of this is that there
has been almost no active market in land. Until a market develops inefﬁciency in
the use of land is inevitable.
International experience indicates that collective forms of agricultural produc-
tion tend to be less efﬁcient than most forms of private farming (Schmitt, 1993).
In Russia in 1991, for example, 72% of the 34 million tonnes potato crop was
grown by the private sector, and the yield on private holdings was 23% higher
than on state and collective farms (Pockney, 1993).
The Effects of Privatization
Approximately 10.6% of collective and state farms are registered in their
previous status. A small number chose to reorganize as Joint-Stock Companies.
Among farms that reorganized, the most common form chosen was as a
Limited-Liability Company (85% of new registrations).
The differences among these different forms of organization are not always
clear. Thus, collective farms often changed their name to agricultural producers
co-operative or limited liability company in the revised charter, without any other
change of substance. Farm enterprises often decided to reorganize as whole
entities without dismantling the collective structure and with virtually no change
544 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 1/No. 4/1998in operating and management systems. Five years after the transformation began
collective production on privately owned land remains the dominant organiza-
tional form in Russia. The reason for this was that as an organizational form it was
by far the easiest way in the light of the lack of capital and land available to the
individual. In addition individuals had been brought up with a collective mind set,
it was rare for individuals to have the skills and education to be able to organize
and manage a farm independently.
This situation is not much different from that found in other countries in
Eastern and Central Europe. For example, in Hungary, a majority of co-operative
members decided to stay in a cooperative framework after receiving ownership
rights to land (Trandaﬁlov and Ivankva-Gidikova, 1993). In Romania, 58% of
privatized land is cultivated in informal peasant associations (Gavrilescu, 1993).
Even peasant farms, which traditionally had been a signiﬁcant source of food, had
become less efﬁcient due to the system for privatization. In January, 1997, for
example, the 278,600 peasant farms covered about 4-5% of all agricultural land.
Despite this, farm size was about 60-75% less than that considered necessary for
efﬁcient operation. The average size of peasant farms in January, 1997 was 44
hectares. The problem was that limits were set on the size of peasant farms by the
Republics or Oblasts. It was very difﬁcult for peasants to obtain greater amounts
of land. Production on new peasant farms remains marginal but is still relatively
important.
The literature on privatization (OECD, 1991) suggests that the process was
slow in many East European countries because there was a lack of efﬁcient capital
markets, major problems in valuation of assets, a great imbalance of market
knowledge, and an unreliable legal system. The results were varied, but two key
consequences identiﬁed concerned the failure of a change of ownership to affect
performance, and what has been called the privatization of the nomenclature
(Crane, 1991) , the usurpation of the newly privatized ﬁrms by members of the old
nomenclature. Other consequences included fraud, problems in tax collection,
unemployment and legal disputes.
A further consequence of the lack of appropriate institutional reform was the
assumption by economists such as Sachs that a quick drive to a market was
possible. In agriculture, the change from hierarchy to market could never be quick
or easy. At the micro level of the enterprise, the change planned production based
on required quantities from each farm to the farm itself deciding what to produce
for what market was a revolution which inevitably would take a minimum of
number of years. The change could only take place on the basis of market
knowledge of customer demand. This required a knowledge base, education, and
expressed demand through communication systems which was not available at the
local level. As a result, privatized farms found themselves in an impossible
position. This posed a severe problem for economists which has yet to be
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as far as the agricultural sector is concerned as a short term solution.
The effect of inﬂation and changing terms of trade in the centrally planned
economy, such as the terms of trade between town and country were often
disadvantageous to the agricultural producer. The situation has not changed. It is
very difﬁcult to show the relative disadvantage. One way of doing this is to
compare the relative value of equipment to a commodity such as grain. For
example, by the end of 1991, the value of a tractor was equal to the value of 267
tonnes of grain. By 1994, the same piece of equipment was equal to the value of
686 tonnes of grain. It thus became relatively more costly for farmers to purchase
industrial goods and equipment. Under the planned economy, terms of trade had
no real meaning as the state owned enterprises were working with soft budgets.
With the advent of the market economy, the situation changed signiﬁcantly.
Enterprises were required, formally, to work on tight terms of trade. In most cases,
payment for products was required within fourteen banking days. The reality,
however, was that when the state purchased agricultural products the terms of
trade were regularly broken as they had no ﬁnance cost to pay for the goods. It
was quite usual for the state to pay three or four months late than the normal due
date.
This created a knock on effect. Farmers required the income in order to buy
inputs such as seed, oil, and petrol and to pay wages. Without the major revenues
from the state coming on time it became impossible for them to purchase and
plant seed at the right time of the year. It also meant that they failed to purchase
fertilizer and pesticides in the required amounts to provide for the best possible
yields. They also found it difﬁcult to buy adequate amounts of petrol and diesel
for tractors and harvesters. All these difﬁculties arising from the failure of the
state to pay for produce led inevitably to lower yields. The failure of the ability
of the farms to enforce the contracts with the state led also to a breakdown in trust
between them. If the state could not abide by its own regulations, farms felt free
to do whatever they could to ensure survival. In addition, employees often did not
get paid for months. This led to tension between managers and workers. It also
encouraged the development of the informal economy (see below). In order to try
to avoid these problems, enterprises sold as much as they could on the free market
or the black market for cash.
Capital Investment Including Equipment
Five years after reform began, there was still an absence of some key
institutions, such as an effective banking sector with a reliable payments system.
There was no reliable insurance industry able to support the agricultural sector.
These ofﬁcial ﬁgures show a signiﬁcant decrease in capital investment in
agriculture in 1996. It would not be a surprise that internal investment was
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to those areas of the economy that provided the surest return in the shortest period.
Almost by deﬁnition, agriculture could not provide a short term return. Credits
were required in the late summer by farms to be ready for the planting season, and
at the earliest, would be returned to the investor 15 months later. But the problem
was that commercial banks usually provided credit for only three months because
inﬂation meant that it was not proﬁtable for them to leave money with farms for
over one year. Even if they did, the farms could not pay back the capital and
interest payments required which might amount to 60 - 80%. If there had been a
market in land, farmers could have mortgaged their land, which might have
increased in value along with inﬂation, but this was not possible because no
market existed.
Investment in equipment has often been inappropriate. Equipment manufac-
turers in the former Soviet Union did not provide products of the type needed by
small and peasant farmers because they were oriented to supply large scale
equipment for the state and collective farms. Monopoly producers, for example,
the Gomelmash factory in Belorus produced a variety of farm equipment. For
example, it was the sole producer of self - propelled combine - harvesters. In the
early 1990s, it became more difﬁcult to buy from Gomelmash because of the need
to buy in foreign currency. Factories in Russia tried to ﬁll the vacuum, but could
not meet demand. The XTZ factory in Xarkov, Ukraine produced tractors. This
factory also required foreign exchange for their products by 1996, and yet they
had not altered their product lines to meet the needs of the new smaller farmers.
The problems of equipment were not only concerned with inappropriate
Figure 1. Capital Investment in the Agriculture of Russia (1990)
Privatization and Transition Issues in Russian Agriculture 547equipment, but also with a complete lack of certain equipment. Internationally the
comparisons show how Russia by the early 1990s was still well behind other
countries in the use of agricultural equipment. For example, in West Germany
(because of the intensive nature of individual farming) there were 201 tractors per
1,000 hectares of land, in the USA (which was farmed extensively) there were 34,
but in Russia, which was also farmed extensively, there were only 11 tractors per
1,000 hectares of land (Pockley, 1993).
In Russia, the shortage of equipment can lead to critical breakdowns in
production. For example, a collective farm may have two combine harvesters
which are available for reaping the crop, which must be done in a speciﬁc two
week period. With most equipment being outdated,there are often breakdowns.
The shortage of combine harvesters means that if even one breaks down, the result
could be devastating for the farm. No substitute equipment is on hand and
signiﬁcant proportions of the crop could be lost.
At the same time, however, it could be suggested that foreign direct investment
could have played a role in agriculture if the conditions were appropriate. The
primary reasons for a relative lack of investment was the lack of any accurate
market information, a lack of any valuation systems and the absence of the
development of a property market.
Other secondary factors included out of date and inefﬁcient production systems
and a lack of quality control and assurance. The critical primary factors preventing
foreign direct investment have meant that readjustment has been limited.
The creation of accurate market information depends on the development of
reliable ﬁnancial institutions which have the ability to create and enforce
contracts. Commentators have been making this point for a number of years
(Ellman, 1993). The consequences of delaying the development of independent
and stable ﬁnancial institutions are serious for both enterprises and the state. At
its most simple it prevents the development of a climate of trust and conﬁdence
throughout the agricultural system. At its worst, it allows the development of a
“shadow economy” or an “informal economy” in which the state is likely to be a
major loser (Booth and Record, 1995).
Physical Infrastructure Including Transport, Distribution, and
Marketing Channels
There will be a continuing need to import a variety of foodstuffs, but the
transport and distribution systems are a problem. With the development of
independent states in the Baltic, Ukraine, and Georgia, Russia has lost some major
ports such as Ismail, Odessa, and Nikolaev in the Ukraine; Lepaja in Latvia; Riga
in Lithuania; Novotallinn in Estonia; and Poti in Batumi in Georgia. Most of these
had modem port facilities. The only ports remaining open on Russian soil were
Murmansk, Archangelsk, Novorossiisk, Vladivostock, and Nakhodka. Novorossi-
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political conditions in the Caucasus, the port has a potentially uncertain future as
a main avenue for imports. The ports on the north west coast are more secure but
have older facilities. The ports on the Paciﬁc have very limited, older facilities and
are linked only by the one rail line that takes over one week to reach Moscow.
Kalinigrad has modem facilities, but imports have to go through the Baltic states
and Belorus to reach Russia. Russia has the ﬁght to free access, but the political
situation is such that there are difﬁculties.
The need to rely on outdated port facilities leads to the loss of some imports.
For example, vegetable and fruit imports have suffered from the lack of adequate
refrigeration and warehousing during transhipment. The increase in intensity of
use of the remaining ports puts pressure on the maintenance both of port facilities
and on the rail and road network. In addition the problem of leakage through
criminal activity remains (see below). The overall conclusion is that there is
wastage of foreign currency earnings to the degree that everything that has been
paid for does not reach the market in Russia. Nobody knows how much is lost. No
ﬁgures are published. This leads us to suggest that further investigation needs to
be undertaken to quantify the costs of such losses.
Practically no independent marketing channels had been created in the ﬁrst ﬁve
years of economic transformation. The state still had a virtual monopoly in
important respects, owning the grain silo and storage houses, as well as
warehouses and refrigeration units for meat, vegetables and fruit. The state still
controlled the main transport systems from the regional warehouses to the
retailers via the rail and road transport system. Yet because of the increased costs
of energy and the inability to maintain these systems the state distribution system
frequently broke down. Many of new collective and private farms found great
difﬁculty in selling their perishable products through the state marketing and
supply channels. One of the major problems was that the farmers were offered
unrealistic prices for their products. The monopolistic structure of the purchasing
organizations and the food processing industry largely explained this situation.
Finally, there was a problem in the food processing industry. Even under the
planned economy there was relatively low capacity leading to waste. Between
1990-1997, with a continuing lack of investment due to the effects of destabili-
zation, not only was the processing industry less able to do its job, but the
standards of processing were insufﬁcient to cater for the speciﬁc needs of a market
economy. Some consumers wanted high quality products which could have been
provided, but were not due to outdated systems. For example, the state system for
processing milk did not provide for the production of the varieties of yoghurt that
became popular in some cities. This led to the creation of small private businesses
and the use of imports to cater for needs which could have been produced by the
state system. There was no viable network of rural shops to sell inputs and
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of agricultural products.
Systemic, Supporting, and Cultural Measures
The government tried to apply price and wage controls in order to control
inﬂation, but between 1991 - 1997 failed to sustain its policy in the light of strong
pressure from critical sectors in industry. It also invited foreign investment, which
was initially slow to invest, but by the mid 1990s began to signiﬁcantly invest in
sectors such as the oil and gas industry. The government also provided some
subsidies to the agricultural sector to try to secure the existence of collective and
state farms (Tulin, 1995) , but this was far below that required to sustain the
sector.
Management Education and Training
A major problem that has been recognized in part, but which has yet to be
seriously addressed, is the lack of management education and training for new
agricultural enterprises. In the emerging market economy perhaps the greatest
need is for a change of “mind set.” It has been seen from earlier studies that there
is a need for a radical change in the psychological approach to work. Fresh
challenges, opportunities to make decisions, and accountability for decisions were
absent in the old regime. The need to create a motivated, efﬁcient, and effective
workforce may be clear, but cannot be created without education and training.
Governmental and international efforts have been established but appear quite
inadequate to the size of the problem. Speciﬁcally, there is a need for technical
knowledge modem operations and processing management, accounting, transport
and logistics, and ﬁnancial and quality management systems. More generally,
there is an almost complete lack of marketing managers and a shortage of retail
outlets.
New private farms are often established by persons not immediately employed
in agriculture. Only about 36% of all private farmers are former members of
collective and state farms; the remaining 64% are from the cities, although the
Russian law requires that to be eligible for allocation of land they must have some
agricultural background or at least training.
Changes in the Business Environment. The Informal Economy
The average wages of agricultural workers were of the order of $45 - $50 per
month in 1997. The work is hard and does not provide great individual job
satisfaction. The wages are not sufﬁcient to cover the normal costs of family life.
The government statistics indicated that for 1997 the essential costs for food per
person amounted to about $76 per month. The question which observers were
forced to consider was, “why do people work in agriculture with these condi-
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provided the opportunity for the operation of a signiﬁcant informal economy,
which was also mirrored in most other aspects of the Russian and other East
European economies. The reason for remaining in even the lowest paid jobs was
that exploitation of the inputs or products could be repatriated to the individual
rather than to the enterprise. For large numbers of workers this was an essential
form of self payment, especially during times of high monetary inﬂation.
In many respects, the informal economy mirrors the formal economy but
instead of money the currency consists of products and services. Formal market
rules are replaced by informal rules which depend for their strength on the
commitment and trust of those involved. In some cases, reliance is placed on what
might be called by some “self policing” but what the formal institutions of the
state would call organized crime. The important point is that the informal
economy not only reduces still further the tax take of the state, it also undermines
to very basis of market reform, by replacing the notion of independent regulation
with regulation by self interested groups.
It would appear that the danger of such consequences had not been sufﬁciently
considered by the economic advisers. Given the inevitable slowness of reform in
the agricultural sector it is surprising that the shock therapists had not considered in
detail how such effects might have been dealt with. Having allowed the emergence of
a vast informal economy by 1997 it could be suggested that rather like Pandora’s
Box it is likely to be a major task to deal with the distorting effects induced by the
informal economy. The difﬁculty appears to be that measures that have been taken
have tended to be speciﬁc attempts to deal with the symptoms of the problem.
For example, measures to improve enforcement by police and customs ofﬁcers
have been instituted, but they still have an almost impossible job. What has not
been done is to try to search out and begin to deal with the fundamental reasons
why the informal economy exists. Detailed academic investigation into this may
not be an easy task, but considering the importance of the issue in economic,
ethical and political terms, it merits funding. Given the lack of funding in the east
it may be that bodies in the west should consider funding studies in this area.
Unfortunately most research bodies in the west, such as the EC’s ACE pro-
gramme, are most concerned with short term research which provides solutions to
speciﬁc problems. Western technical assistance programmes, such as those sponsored
by the World Bank, are similarly are oriented to very practical objectives.
CONCLUSION
Some commentators will argue that there is no possibility of returning to a
planned economy and as such efforts to drive through the shock therapy approach
should be redoubled. However, the economic reforms are by no means certain in
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sections of society. Indeed in the elections of December 1995, the Communist
Party won a majority of seats in the Duma.
The agricultural question in Russia is at a turning point. If we look again at
the four dimensions of adjustment applied to the agricultural sector we can see
that on a simple assessment economic adjustment had not been successful
between 1990-1997. To conclude, we suggest that on each of them there has been
no signiﬁcant adjustment.
Monetary and Fiscal Measures
Monetary stabilization had not been achieved by 1997. Control over the money
supply may have been partially achieved, but inﬂation has continued to be a major
threat, and there was no effective control over credit. Large budgetary deﬁcits
remain. A modem tax system was not in prospect by early 1997. The exchange
rate by the mid 1990s continued to be unrealistic. The were three rates available,
the ofﬁcial rate, the “market” rate and the black-market rate. The currency was not
effectively convertible. The trade regime was not liberal as there were signiﬁcant
blockages preventing foreign investment in agriculture.
Institutional Measures
The new legal system had not provided a clearly deﬁned and enforced property
rights system because there was a lack of an effective property market and rights
have no meaning unless they can be effectively exchanged. The state had not
retreated from public ownership in critical areas of the agricultural economy, such
as the regional transport and distribution system. The directives and laws on the
creation of new private agribusiness were restrictive and did not allow the
development of fair and free markets. Privatization has not in many cases really
taken place. We have seen instead the development of ersatz privatization. Those
enterprises which remained publicly owned remained embedded in the soft budget
system which had been so disastrous in the past. Industrial and agricultural
deconcentration has not gone far enough to allow trade and foreign investment.
Systemic, Supporting, and Sultural Measures
The social safety net was completely inadequate to deﬁned needs. As was
shown above this led to desperate poverty. The income and wealth system was not
egalitarian, and business ethics was seen as a critical failure throughout the period.
The business environment was chaotic and unpredictable. Public administration
appeared to be almost non-existent. The development of the informal economy
was an inevitable consequence of this.
On these measures, adjustment does not appear to have been effective during
the ﬁrst seven years of “economic reform.” Finally, the crucial point that appears
552 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 1/No. 4/1998to have escaped the attention of economists both in the west and those directly
advising the Russian government has been the need to take time to change the
“mind set” of the population. It can be suggested that it would take generations to
develop an understanding of how a market is understood in the west. To have even
attempted the “shock therapy” approach, without preparing the population and
providing a meaningful support system is illogical. A market could never have
been developed without such assistance. In any case, it could be argued that it
would be inappropriate, as the Russian culture, social and political environment is
such that no blueprint could possibly be successfully brought to bear on a system
so ﬁxed. What is now slowly developing is something quite different. Russian
society is creating for itself a Russian interpretation of what a market economy is,
which will almost certainly be unique in its conﬁguration.
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